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SHIFfING THE BOUNDARY BE1WEEN THE 
SECTIONS 402 AND 404 PERMITTING 
PROGRAMS BY EXPANDING THE 
DEFINITION OF FILL MATERIAL 
NATHANIEL BROWAND* 
Abstract: The section 404 permitting program has endured a history of 
divergent interpretations from both the agencies that operate the pro-
gram and the courts. In 2002, these agencies, the Army Corps of Engin-
eers and EPA, redefined fill material to include many activities under the 
section 404 program that did not appear to be included under the 
previous definition. One of these activities is the disposal of excess dirt 
and bedrock in the Nation's waters from strip mining operations. Efforts 
to thwart this disposal activity have been met with increasing resistance by 
the courts, while efforts to minimize the adverse environmental effects of 
this type of disposal have forced the Army Corps to propose developing a 
coordinated permit process with other involved agencies. This Note 
argues that the new definition of fill material expands the scope of the 
section 404 program to include activities that at one time were or could 
have become subject to regulation under EPA's more rigorous section 402 
program. 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean 
Water Act or CWA) has been described as "one of the simplest statutes 
to describe and one of the most painful to apply."1 Others have found 
that because of the loss of wetlands attributable to the program, Con-
gress should relieve the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) of its 
section 404 permitting responsibilities.2 Nevertheless, the section 404 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2003-04. 
I would like to thank my parents, Anna Nicole McGee, and the law review staff for their 
help and support during the production of this Note. 
1 Oliver A Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 773 (1989). 
2 Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean 
Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 695, 698-99 (1989) (claiming that the section 404 permitting program has 
been unable to prevent the loss of over 300,000 acres of wetlands annually). 
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program occupies a tenuous location between activities that are not 
subject to federal regulation and activities that are subject to a more 
rigorous federal regulation by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) under section 402 of the CWA3 
The scope of the section 404 program, while subject to differing 
pressures from outside organizations, has varied considerably 
throughout its history.4 Generally, environmental advocacy groups 
have argued for coverage of activities under the section 404 program 
where the alternative would be no federal environmental regulation;5 
they have argued in favor of section 402 regulation by EPA over the 
section 404 program for activities that could arguably be subject to 
either permitting program.6 Contrariwise, industries and landowners 
have sought to limit the section 404 program where the alternative is 
no federal environmental regulation,7 but they have sought to expand 
the coverage of the section 404 program where the alternative is regu-
lation by EPA8 In light of the 2002 regulation changes, variations in 
the scope of the section 404 program are likely to continue. 
Because the section 404 program is jointly administered by the 
Corps and EPA-with the Corps having the most decisive power in the 
program-each agency has developed an approach towards the pro-
gram that has not always been consistent with the other agency's ap-
proach.9 Until recently EPA has sought to give the Corps broad 
authority, while the Corps has imposed more restrictive terms over its 
own authority,1o This avoidance dynamic between the two agencies 
has yielded to embracing an expansion of the program into regulat-
ing activities that may before have been under the purview of EPAll 
Accordingly, the Corps is regulating more activities than it has since 
the inception of the section 404 program,12 
This Note suggests that the Corps and EPA have adopted this in-
dustry and landowner perspective toward expanding the scope of the 
5 See discussion infra Part IV. 
4 See Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 2, at 703-08. 
5 See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 901-02 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
6 See, e.g., Regulatory Programs of the Corps, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,130 (july 19, 
1977). 
7 See, e.g., Avuyelles Sportsmen ~ League, 715 F.2d at 900. 
8 See, e.g., W. Va. Coal Ass'n v. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (S.D. W. Va. 1989), aff'd 
per curiam, Nos. 90-2034, 90-2040,1991 WL 75217 (4th eir. May 13.1991). 
9 See discussion infra Part II. 
10 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
11 See discussion infra Parts II.F, IV. 
12 See discussion infra Parts II.F. IV. 
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section 404 permitting program to an extent not seen in the pro-
gram's thirty years. Part I provides a historical development of the sec-
tion 404 permitting program and an overview of how it operates. Part 
II traces the definition of fill material throughout the duration of the 
section 404 program by EPA and the Corps. Part III examines the is-
sue of discharging excess material from mountaintop mining in valley 
streams, considers how courts have applied, or refused to apply, the 
section 404 program to these activities, and presents current chal-
lenges that regulatory agencies are facing in administering the pro-
gram. Part IV challenges the recent new definition of fill material by 
EPA and the Corps, and concludes that this new definition expands 
the section 404 program into regulating activities that may have been 
susceptible to EPA regulation under section 402. 
I. THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM AND ITS HISTORY 
In 1972, Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act and created a national program to control water pollution in the 
waters of the United States. l3 The stated purpose of the Act is "to re-
store and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the nation's waters."l4 The amendments that comprise what is now 
referred to as the Clean Water Act prohibit the discharge of pollut-
ants into the waters of the United States without a permit. l5 To ac-
complish this, the CWA established the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) that gives EPA the authority to issue 
permits limiting discharges of specific concentrations of pollutants 
from point sources. l6 These NPDES permits under section 402 of the 
CWA limit the concentrations of pollutants allowed in wastewater dis-
charges by requiring the use of technology-based wastewater pollution 
control systemsP 
Even prior to the passage of the CWA, the Corps had authority 
under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (RHA) to regulate 
shipping channels. ls In light of the tension created between the broad 
authority granted to EPA to control pollutants under the NPDES pro-
I! Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 
Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000». 
14 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). 
15 [d. § 1311. 
16 [d. § 1342. 
17 [d. 
18 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 § lO, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000). 
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gram and the Corps's existing authority under the RHA, Congress 
passed section 404 as an exception to the NPDES program.19 
The initially proposed Senate bill, that became the section 404 
program, consisted of a permitting program for only the discharge of 
dredged spoil not fill material and was to be incorporated as a part of 
the NPDES program.20 The House amendments established a sepa-
rate permitting program, called section 404, for the discharge of 
dredged or fill material administered solely by the Corps.21 The final 
bill that passed more closely resembled the House amendment; how-
ever, provisions were added that, most notably, gave EPA authority to 
provide guidelines that the Corps must follow in reviewing section 404 
applications.22 
Section 404 operates under authority of the Corps with substan-
tial assistance by EPA,23 and extends beyond the coverage of the RHA 
to include the permitting for dredge and fill material in all waters of 
the United States, most notably wetlands.24 By contrast, section 10 of 
the RHA authorizes the Corps to regulate structures and dredging for 
ship traffic and navigation.25 And unlike the CWA, the scope of sec-
tion 10 of the RHA is limited only to navigable waters, and the Corps 
traditionally limited its jurisdiction up to the mean high tide line.26 
Section 13 of the RHA, referred to as the Refuse Act, prohibited the 
discharge of refuse into the navigable waters without a permit.27 
Though initially successful, courts invalidated the use of this section 
as a vehicle against more general discharges of pollution; it did, how-
ever, provide a basis for the more inclusive CWA and was later explic-
itly replaced by the NPDES permitting program.28 
19 33 V.S.C. § 1342(a) (1); 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.12 
(1986); Michael Hollins, Addition by Removal? National Mining Limits Section 404 Control of 
Construction in Wetlands, 14]. LAND VSE & ENVTL. L. 341, 346 (1999). Initially the Corps 
viewed section 404 not as a program that was excepted from EPA, but as an exemption 
from EPA's NPDES program for its section 10 RHA regulatory program. See Blumm & 
Zaleha, supra note 2, at 704. 
20 S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, at 141 (1972), reprinted in 1972 V.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3818. 
21 [d. 
22 [d. at 3819; see discussion infra Part I.C. 
23 Revisions to the Regulatory Definition of "Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,130 
(May 9, 2002) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323; 40 C.F.R. pt. 232). 
24 Hollins, supra note 19, at 351. 
25 [d. 
26 2 RODGERS, supra note 19, § 4.12. 
27 33 V.S.C. § 407 (2000). 
28 Hollins, supra note 19, at 352-53. 
2004] Shifting Boundaries: CWA §402, §404, and the Dejinitian ofFill 621 
A. An Expansion in Geographic Jurisdiction 
The scope of EPA's authority under the CWA, though ostensibly 
limited by its language to "navigable waters," in fact extends to all of 
"the waters of the United States" permitted by the Commerce 
Clause.29 The exact extent of this authority is strongly debated and 
has been recently limited,30 but is generally thought to include wet-
lands adjacent to waters that may affect interstate commerce.31 Like-
wise, the 1975 district court decision Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Callaway held that the Corps's self-imposed limitation on section 404 
permitting to navigable waters was invalid, thereby extending the sec-
tion 404 geographic jurisdiction to be coterminous with section 402.32 
B. The 1977 Amendments 
In 1977, Congress again amended the CWA, including some 
changes to the section 404 program.33 The amendments endorsed the 
Callaway case expansion of the section 404 program to all waters of 
the United States, exempted some activities from coverage under the 
program, and provided for a general permit procedure covering some 
activities.34 Discharges of fill material from the following activities 
were exempted from being covered under section 404: normal farm-
ing, silviculture, ranching activities, emergency reconstruction of 
structures such as dikes and dams, the construction of farm ponds, 
the construction of irrigation ditches, and the construction of farm or 
logging roads.35 These exemptions were introduced to address con-
cerns about whether particular activities may require permits and to 
29 2 RODGERS, supra note 19, § 4.12. 
!!O Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
174 (2001) (invalidating an interpretation of 33 C.F.R. § 328(a)(3) (1999) that allowed 
section 404 permitting jurisdiction over isolated wetlands because migratory birds may 
have used these wetlands as habitat). 
31 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985) (holding 
that the Army Corps had section 404 jurisdiction over wetlands abutting navigable waters); 
see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (7) (2002) (stating that the term "waters of the United States" 
includes wetlands adjacent to waters that may be susceptible to use in or could affect inter-
state commerce). 
32 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). 
33 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000». 
34 S. REP. No. 95-370, at 74-75 (1977). reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4399-400. 
35 33 U.S.C. § 1344(£)(1) (2000). 
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eliminate the use of the permitting program for certain types of dis-
charges.36 
General permits may be issued on a state, regional, or nationwide 
basis for a period of five years after notice and opportunity for a public 
hearing for activities involving discharges of dredge or fill material that 
"will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when per-
formed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse ef-
fects on the environment."37 Activities authorized under general per-
mits are thereby exempted from the individual permit requirements.38 
Because these activities covered by a nationwide permit are considered 
to have only minimal environmental effects, they are not subject to re-
view under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).39 General 
permits have been used so extensively for certain activities that individ-
ual permits are not used.40 Critics of the nationwide program contend 
that the application process is desirable to regulated industries. 41 Pro-
ponents of the nationwide program note that EPA's procedural checks 
of the 404 (b)( 1) guidelines and the 404 (c) veto authority, discussed 
infra, apply to both nationwide and individual permit applications, 
while individual permit applications have more associated complexities 
and costs.42 Undoubtedly, the appropriate scope of the nationwide 
permitting program is an important and contentious issue within the 
section 404 program. 43 
36 S. REP. No. 95-370, at 74-75. 
37 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e). 
gs Id. 
39 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000) (stat-
ing that environmental impact statements are required for "major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the environment"). 
40 Paul A Duffy, How Filled Was My Valley: Continuing the Debate on Disposal Impacts, 17 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 143, 145 (2003) (stating that 84.4% of section 404 applications 
between 1996 and 1999 were handled under general permit programs); see also 
Mountaintop Mining and U.S. EPA s Proposed Rule Change: A Giant Step Backward for the Clean 
Water Act, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,175, 11,176 (Dec. 2000) ("Every valley fill in 
West Virginia has been approved pmsuant to an NWP [nationwide permit], rather than an 
individual permit.") [hereinafter Mountaintop Mining]. 
41 Duffy, supra note 40, at 145 ("Nationwide permits allow for the fast approval of proj-
ects with little or no administrative delay, and ... approval under nationwide permits is 
relatively quick and easy and thus such permits are much more desirable to coal compa-
nies. "). 
42 Blair M. Gardner, Reconciling Surface Mining and the CWA: Section 404(B) (1) and Miti-
gation, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 146, 148 (2003). 
43 See Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 2, at 766 (stating that "general permits are a sub-
stantial contributing factor in the alarming annual rate of national wetlands loss"); 
Gardner, supra note 42, at 148 (suggesting that the Corps has been timid in justifying its 
nationwide permit program). 
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C. The Operation oj the Section 404 Program 
The Corps administers the section 404 permitting program with 
the assistance of EPA.44 Section 404(a) states that the Secretary of the 
Army "may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public 
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the naviga-
ble waters at specific disposal sites."45 Section 404(b) (1) directs the 
Corps to apply guidelines developed by EPA in considering applica-
tions for these permits.46 These section 404 (b) (1) guidelines stress the 
consideration of practicable alternatives, the analysis of impacts of the 
fill material on the aquatic area, and the minimization of the adverse 
effects of the discharges.47 The guidelines, furthermore, establish a 
presumption against the issuance of a permit for activities involving 
the discharge of fill material unless alternatives are impracticable.48 
Section 404(b)(2), however, gives the Corps the authority to issue a 
permit for a site where the guidelines would not allow the issuance of 
a permit, when the economic impact of the site on navigation war-
rants the issuing of a permit.49 In addition, EPA may veto the issuance 
of a permit by the Corps if the discharge of material at that site will 
have an "unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, 
shellfish beds and fishery areas, wildlife, or recreational areas. "50 
Thus, the relationship between the two agencies in administering the 
section 404 program has been called "a ping-pong veto practice. "51 
II. A HISTORY OF FILL MATERIAL 
The Corps and EPA have had different definitions of what consti-
tutes fill material for most of the history of the section 404 program.52 
44 Timothy J. Hagerty, Surface Mining and the Clean Water Act: The 402/404 Conflict and 
the Regulation of Valley Fills, in WETLANDS LAW AND REGULATION 174, 178 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. 
COURSE OF STUDY, May 29-31,2002), available in Westlaw, SG096 ALI-ABA 174. The extent 
of EPA's role in the section 404 permitting program is one of emphasis and attitude. Com-
pare Duffy, supra note 40, at 145 (asserting that "EPA has only minimal oversight over the 
Corps' Section 404 permits"), with Gardner, supra note 42, at 148 ("Contrary to the sugges-
tion in Paul DuffY's article, EPA has a pervasive presence in Section 404 permitting."). 
45 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000). 
46 [d. § 1344(b)(I). 
47 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.10, .11, .70-.77 (2002). 
48 40 C.FR § 230.IO(a). 
49 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (2). 
50 [d. § 1344(c). This provision has been invoked by EPA only eleven times since 1972. 
See Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 93.3 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2002), vacated by 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003). 
51 2 RODGERS, supra note 19, § 4.12. 
52 Hagerty, supra note 44, at 178-79. 
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In 1974 the Corps expanded the definition of fill material to mean 
"any material deposited or discharged into navigable waters which 
may result in creating fastlands or other planned elevations of lands 
beneath navigable waters. "53 In response to Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Callaway, which forced the Corps to redefine navigable wa-
ters, the Corps also proposed to redefine fill material. 54 The Corps 
proposed fill material to mean "any material discharged into naviga-
ble waters for a purpose other than disposal, including without limita-
tion, the creating of fast land, or the production of intended elevation 
of land beneath the water, but excluding material discharged in navi-
gable waters subject to section 402 .... "55 Later in 1975, after the no-
tice and comment period, the Corps defined fill material to mean 
"any pollutant used to create fill in the traditional sense of replacing 
an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a 
water body for any purpose."56 In 1976, EPA adopted this definition.57 
The most striking conflict from this period is that the Corps and 
EPA developed very different attitudes toward the section 404 pro-
gram.58 On the one hand, the Corps hesitantly expanded its jurisdic-
tion in response to the Callaway case.59 On the other hand, EPA saw a 
robust section 404 program as the means to protect the waters of the 
United States.60 These differing philosophies toward the section 404 
program led to the divergent definitions adopted by the two agen-
cies.61 
5! 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (4) (1975). 
54 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,766, 19,766, 19,770 (pro-
posed May 6, 1975). 
55 [d. at 19,770. 
56 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (6) (1976). 
57 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, app. A (1976). 
58 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. at 19,794; Permits for Activi-
ties in Navigable Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320,31,320 (July 25,1975). 
59 See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. at 31,320 ("[The Corps] 
recognize[s] that this program ... will extend Federal regulation over discharges of 
dredged or fill material to many areas that have never before been subject to Federal per-
mits or to this form of water quality protection."). 
60 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. at 19,794 ("EPA believes that 
a broad implementation of the section 404 program is necessary to protect the Nation's 
water resources. "). 
61 Compare Regulatory Programs of the Corps, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,130 (July 19, 
1977) (defining fill material as "any material used for the primary pU1pose of replacing an 
aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody" and stating 
that "activities such as plowing, cultivating, seeding, and harvesting, cultivating ... cannot 
be included in the program") (emphasis added), with 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, app. A (defining 
fill material as "any pollutant used to ... replac[e] an aquatic area with dry land or ... 
chang [e] the bottom elevation of a waterbody for any purpose") (emphasis added). 
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A. The Corps Adopts a Primary Purpose Test 
The Corps in 1977 redefined fill material through informal 
rulemaking to mean "any material used for the primary purpose of 
replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom 
elevation of a waterbody. The term does not include any pollutant 
discharged into the water primarily to dispose of waste, as that activity 
is regulated under Section 402. "62 Pollutants include "solid waste, ... 
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and indus-
trial, municipal, and agricultural wastes discharged into water. "63 The 
implication of this definition is that any waste disposal of a pollutant 
would not be subject to section 404, while material not qualifYing as a 
waste disposal of a pollutant would be subject to this primary purpose 
test to determine whether it is fill material.64 
As the reason for the 1977 rule change, the Corps noted that 
some municipal discharges of solid waste material technically met the 
definition of fill material, but decided it should be regulated by sec-
tion 402 going forward. 65 The Corps stated that the final result of dis-
posing "waste materials such as sludge, garbage, trash, and debris in 
water ... may be a landfill even though the primary purpose of the 
discharge is waste disposal. "66 In order to ensure that these activities 
that should be governed by section 402 do not become discharges of 
fill material under section 404, the Corps concluded that the initial 
determination of whether a permit should be granted for these types 
of discharges should be made by EPA under section 402. Further-
more, the Corps decided that action on a section 404 application in 
this area would not be taken until EPA reached a section 402 permit 
decision.67 This definition, which was unchanged for twenty-five 
62 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2001). 
63 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. 
64 See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e). 
66 Regulatory Programs of the Corps, 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,130. The traditional subject of 
section 404 permitting is using material "to fill in a wetland to build a vacation home, or 
... as the bedrock material for a bridge or pier or other activity on or over the navigable 
waters." Robert W. Adler, Water Quality Protection, 15 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENvn. 
L. 311, 314 (1995). 
66 Regulatory Programs of the Corps, 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,130. 
67 See id. 
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years,68 was also consistent with the Corps's philosophy of hesitantly 
expanding its regulatory authority.69 
B. EPA Rejects the Primary Purpose Definition 
Meanwhile, EPA, while never adopting this primary purpose test, 
did look to the purpose of the disposal activity by defining fill material 
as "any pollutant used to create fill in the traditional sense of replac-
ing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation 
of a water body for any purpose."70 In 1980, however, EPA-under in-
formal rulemaking-changed its definition of fill material to an ef-
fects-based test after proposing a primary purpose test at the begin-
ning of the rulemaking.71 Under this change, EPA defined fill 
material as "any 'pollutant' which replaces portions of the 'waters of 
the United States' with dry land or which changes the bottom eleva-
tion of a water body for any purpose. "72 
The agency found the 404 program to be better suited than the 
402 program in preventing the destruction of wetlands because: (1) 
the section 404(b) (1) guidelines require the consideration of practi-
cable alternatives, while the 402 program does not; (2) the guidelines 
consider the ecological impact of the discharge while the 402 pro-
gram uses technology based limitations; and (3) 404 permits are for 
specific sites while 402 permits are issued for point sources.73 EPA 
concluded "that all discharges with the effect of fill should be handled 
under the 404 program instead of the 402 program. "74 Because an 
effects-based test will likely include more activities than a primary 
68 See Revisions to the Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material," 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 
21,294 (proposed Apr. 20, 2000). 
69 See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,320 (July 25, 
1975) ("[The Corps] recognize[s] that this program ... will extend Federal regulation 
over discharges of dredged or fill material to many areas that have never before been sub-
ject to Federal permits or to this form of water quality protection."). 
70 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, app. A (1976) (emphasis added). 
71 Consolidated Permit Regulations: CWA Section 404 Dredge or Fill Programs, 45 
Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,299 (May 19, 1980). 
72 [d. at 33,421. The agencies describe this definition as "focus[ing] on the effect of 
the material, rather than allowing the purpose of the discharge to affect whether it would 
be regulated by section 404 or section 402." Revisions to the Regulatory Definitions of "Fill 
Material," 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 21,294 (proposed Apr. 20, 2000). 
73 Consolidated Permit Regulations: CWA Section 404 Dredge or Fill Programs, 45 
Fed. Reg. at 33,299. 
74 [d. 
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purpose test, EPA has continued to believe that a broad implementa-
tion of the section 404 program best protects the nation's water. 75 
This change adopted by EPA, however, was not immediately 
codified in EPA's regulations.76 Rather, the 1981 regulations retained 
EPA's and the Corps's 1976 definition before the Corps adopted its 
primary purpose test in 1977.77 The 1982 regulations drop these ap-
pended definitions and do not appear to define fill materiaJ.78 Finally, 
the 1983 regulations, in the context of state issued section 404 per-
mits, define fill material as "any 'pollutant' which replaces portions of 
the 'waters of the United States' with dry land or which changes the 
bottom elevation ofa water body for any purpose."79 EPA maintained 
this definition until the recent 2002 change.so 
In 1984, the Corps signed a settlement agreement to a suit 
brought by environmental groups that, among other things, required 
the Corps to: (1) deny section 404 permit applications that do not 
comply with EPA's section 404(b)(l) guidelines; (2) demand that 
general permitees obtain individual permits for activities that cause 
the loss or substantial modification of ten or more acres of water; and 
(3) promulgate, in cooperation with EPA, a revised, joint definition of 
fill material.81 The Corps and EPA spent two years working toward a 
resolution regarding the definition of fill material, but instead of 
adopting a joint definition, they arrived at an interim agreement that 
allowed the agencies to consistently regulate discharges and coordi-
nate practices between the two permitting programs.82 
75 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,766, 19,794 (proposed 
May 6,1975). 
76 See 40 C.F.R. § 233.3 (1983); 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (1982); 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, app. A 
(1981). 
7740 C.F.R. pt. 230, app. A (1981) (defining fill material as "any pollutant used to cre-
ate fill in the traditional sense of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing . 
the bottom elevation of a water body for any purpose"). 
78 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (1982). 
79 40 C.F.R. § 233.3 (1983). 
80 See Revisions to the Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material," 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 
21,294 (proposed Apr. 20, 2000); see also discussion infra Part II.F. 
8) Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,262, 20,262-65 
(D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1984); Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 2, at 710-12 (stating that "ttl he elec-
tion of Ronald Reagan brought new challenges to 404 implementation ... and led sixteen 
environmental groups to file suit" to enjoin the implementation of an expanded nation-
wide general permit program). 
82 Memorandum of Agreement on Solid Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 8871, 8871 (Mar. 14, 
1986). 
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C. 1986 Memorandum Reconciles the Agencies' Understanding 
In 1986, the Corps and EPA entered into a memorandum of 
agreement to reconcile the sections 402 and 404 practice that devel-
oped from these different definitions of fill material, especially with 
respect to discharges of solid wastes.53 The agreement established four 
criteria that attempted to divide homogeneous wastes-presumably 
waste materials of a substantially identical nature-regulated by sec-
tion 402 from heterogeneous wastes, regulated by section 404.84 
Specifically, a discharge was to be treated as fill material under section 
404 in light of the following factors: (1) the primary or principle pur-
pose of the discharge is "to replace a portion of the waters of the 
United States with dry land or to raise the bottom elevation"; (2) "the 
discharge results from road construction or other ... construction-
type activities"; (3) "a principal effect of the discharge is physical loss 
or physical modification of waters of the United States"; and (4) "the 
discharge is heterogeneous in nature and of the type normally associ-
ated with sanitary landfill discharges."85 Thus these indicia determine 
whether particular activities involving solid wastes are subject to sec-
tion 404 regulation.86 
On the other hand, a pollutant was to be treated under section 
402 if "it is a discharge in liquid, semi-liquid, or suspended form or if 
it is a discharge of solid material of a homogeneous nature normally 
associated with single industry wastes, and from a fixed conveyance, 
or if trucked, from a single site and set of known processes. "87 Fur-
thermore, the agencies specified that "placer mining wastes, phos-
phate mining wastes, titanium mining wastes, sand and gravel wastes, 
fly ash, and drilling muds" were to be subject to the section 402 pro-
gram.88 Finally, the agencies agreed that they would identify addi-
tional materials to be subject to section 402 as necessary.89 
These factors and examples of activities served as useful guide-
posts, but did not remove ambiguities in specific applications of the 
definition of fill material and interface between the section 402 and 
sg [d. 
84 [d. 
B6 [d. at 8872. See also Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 
F. Supp. 2d 927, 940 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), vacated by 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that 
it is unclear whether these factors are to be considered disjunctive or conjunctive). 
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section 404 regulatory programs to activities such as strip mining.90 
The first factor appears to be nothing more than a diluted primary 
purpose test and the third factor seems to be an effects-based test with 
some additional bite.91 Therefore, these indicia are ambiguous be-
cause it is unclear how much weight each factor should be accorded 
and how many factors must be satisfied to conclude that a particular 
discharge is a discharge of fill materia1.92 
D. The Courts Develop Two Perspectives 
Over time, courts developed two perspectives towards the Corps's 
primary purpose test of fill materia1.93 For example, in 1983 the Fifth 
Circuit considered a case involving private landowners who wanted to 
convert 20,000 acres of forested bayou into agricultural land.94 Be-
cause of the undulating topography of the land, the landowners had 
the harvested trees and vegetation tilled in to the ground to create a 
more suitable contour.95 The court found that burying this material 
had the effect of leveling a tract of land, which was sufficient to be 
included in the Corps's primary purpose test, because the activity was 
intended to replace water with dry land.96 The court in essence was 
willing to find the primary purpose required by the Corps definition 
by considering the effect that the activity of burying material had on 
the land and concluding that such an effect can inform the primary 
purpose of the activity.97 This connection between purpose and effects 
became conflated and led to the conclusion that if the effect of mate-
rial discharged is fill, then the material should be treated as fill mate-
rial under the Corps's primary purpose test.98 
By contrast, in 1998, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the 
Corps had the authority to handle the permitting for the construction 
of a municipal solid waste landfill under section 404.99 Twenty-one 
acres of wetland would need to be filled to construct the proposed 
90 See discussion infra Part IV. 
91 See discussion infra Part IV. 
92 See discussion infra Part IV. 
9S See Res. Invs., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 151 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983). 
94 Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, 715 F.2d at 901. 
95 [d. 
96 [d. at 924-25. 
97 See id. 
98 See, e.g., Revisions to the Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material," 65 Fed. Reg. 
21,992,21,994-95 (proposed Apr. 20, 2000). 
99 Res. Invs., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 151 F.3d 1162, 1163 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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168-acre landfill. loo The court held that the discharge of solid waste in 
a proposed solid waste landfill, though having the effect of fiU, does 
not satisfy the Corps's primary purpose test and therefore cannot be 
regulated by the section 404 program.10I The court reasoned that a 
disposal of solid waste does not fit the primary purpose test because 
the purpose of such a disposal is neither to replace a waterbody with 
dry land nor to change the bottom elevation ofa waterbody.lo2 
In 1999, an Illinois district court considered a suit brought by the 
Corps alleging violations of a section 404 permit gran ted to develop-
. ers of a residential subdivision,lo3 The Corps contended that the ero-
sion controls implemented as required by the permit were so inade-
quate that six inches of sediment from the development site had been 
deposited into adjacent wetlands. 104 The court granted the develop-
ers' motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the sedi-
ment deposited in the wetlands did not constitute fill material under 
the Corps's definition, and therefore the Corps could not allege that 
the sediment deposited was under the jurisdiction of the section 404 
permit granted.105 Following the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the 
primary purpose test as requiring more than simply the deposition of 
material having the effect of fill, the court stated that "[r]ocks and 
dirt carried away by stormwater ... do not automatically become 
'dredged or fill material' just because they end up at the bottom of a 
creek. "106 The court concluded that this sediment was more likely 
waste and therefore specifically excluded from the section 404 pro-
gram because waste is within the jurisdiction of EPA under the 
NPDES program.107 
The Ninth Circuit decision drove the Corps and EPA to propose 
abandoning the primary purpose test out of a concern that most 
fill serves some purpose other than just creating dry land or 
changing a water body's bottom elevationL and] ... taken to 
100 Id. at 1164. 
101 Id. at 1168. The court emphasized the consistency of the decision with the other 
solid waste responsibilities of EPA, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
and the traditional military and navigational missions of the Corps. Id. at 1169. 
102 Id. Furthermore, the court also noted that the Corps's regulations explicitly ex-
cluded waste from being fill material because it is regulated under section 402. Id. 
105 United States v. United Homes, Inc., No. 98-C-3242, 1999 WI.. 117701, at *1 (N.D. 
Dl. Mar. I, 1999). 
104Id. 
105 Id. at *3. 
106Id. 
107 Id. at *3-4. 
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its extreme conclusion, the unreasonable end result could 
be that almost any traditional fill material proposed to be 
placed in the waters of the U.S. does not need a section 404 
permit. lOB 
631 
Accordingly, the agencies advocated an effects-based test over a test 
that considers the purpose ofthe discharge.l09 
E. The Corps and EPA Propose an Effects-Based Test 
These split circuit decisions even tually resulted in a change to 
Corps and EPA rules. 110 In 2000, the Corps and EPA jointly proposed 
a new single definition of fill material for both agencies that resem-
bled EPA's effects test.1lI The purpose of the change was to clarifY ex-
isting practice by the agencies and to determine more clearly whether 
a particular discharge of a pollutant would be subject to section 402 
or section 404.112 Specifically, the agencies proposed fill material to 
mean "material (including but not limited to rock, sand, and earth) 
that has the effect of: (i) replacing any portion of water of the United 
States with dry land; or (ii) changing the bottom elevation of any por-
tion of a water of the United States. "113 Fill material would not include 
"discharges covered by an NPDES permit issued under section 402 of 
the Clean Water Act. "114 
Accordingly, the agencies proposed an effects-based test for the 
definition of fill material that applies to material that is not a pollut-
ant subject to section 402.115 Thus, the proposed definition moves to a 
broader effects test while it avoids encroaching on the already expan-
sive jurisdiction of pollutant under section 402 that was recognized in 
the 1986 memorandum of agreement on solid waste between the two 
agencies.116 
In addition, the Corps considered a provision that would prohibit 
the agency from handling a section 404 permit application when the 
regional engineer determines that a proposed discharge would be a 
108 Revisions to the Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material," 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 
21,294 (proposed Apr. 20, 2000). 





114 Revisions to the Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material," 65 Fed. Reg. at 21,300. 
115 Id. 
116Id. at 21,292. 
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discharge of unsuitable fill material which includes trash, debris, and 
car bodies.1l7 Finally, the rule proposed the addition of strip mining 
overburden as an activity to be included within the definition of a dis-
charge of fill materiaPl8 
F. The Corps and EPA Adopt a Different Effects-Based Test 
In 2002, after a change in presidential administrations and over 
17,000 comments on the proposed rule, the two agencies adopted a 
different effects-based definition of fill material that specifically ex-
cludes only trash or garbage.1l9 The Corps and EPA both currently 
define fill material as "material placed in waters of the United States 
... [that] has the effect of (i) replacing any portion of a water of the 
United States with dry land; or (ii) changing the bottom elevation of 
any portion of a water of the United States."120 For both agencies the 
term specifically includes "rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction 
debris, wood chips, overburden from mining or other excavation ma-
terial, and materials used to create any structure or infrastructure in 
the waters in the United States" and specifically excludes trash or gar-
bage. l2l Thus, the agencies abandoned the specific exclusion of wastes 
in favor of a more limited exclusion of trash and garbage.l 22 
III. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE MOVING BOUNDARY: STRIP MINING, 
OVERBURDEN, AND SPOIL 
Strip mining is a common method of surface mining in Appala-
chia for coal and in the western United States for precious metals 
such as gold. 123 It is characterized by clearing an area, typically a 
mountaintop, of vegetation and removing the dirt and bedrock to ex-
pose seams of coal or precious metals for removal.l 24 The dirt and 
bedrock that must be removed to access a coal or mineral seam is re-
117 [d. at 21,296. 
liB [d. at 21,297. 
119 See Revisions to the Regulatory Definition of "Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 
31,131,31,143 (May 9,2002) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323; 40 C.F.R. pt. 232). 
120 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(I) (2002); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2. 
121 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2)-(3); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2. 
122 Revisions to the Regulatory Definition of "Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,133-34. 
128 See Mountaintop Mining, supra note 40, at 11,175; see also Friends of Santa Fe County 
v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (D.N.M. 1995) (involving the disposal of 
overburden from a gold mining operation). 
124 See Mountaintop Mining, supra note 40, at 11,175. 
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ferred to as overburden.125 Once removed, overburden is called 
SpOil.126 In accordance with the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act (SMCRA), mining operators must restore a mined mountain 
to its approximate, original shape upon finishing excavation.127 After 
removing the coal or mineral and restoring the mountain to its ap-
propriate shape, mine operators are left with excess spoil that must be 
disposed of "because spoil takes up more space than did the original 
overburden. "128 
A. Excess Spoil as Waste 
A series of cases has arisen over the issue of whether the Corps 
has the authority to grant section 404 permits for filling valley streams 
with this excess spoiI.129 For instance, in 1989, a coal mining associa-
tion challenged an EPA policy prohibiting the disposal of spoil in val-
ley streams and the use of wastewater treatment impoundment ponds 
by claiming that such activities are governed by the Corps's 404 per-
mitting program, not EPA's 402 permitting program.130 The court 
reasoned that even though this activity is within EPA's broader 
definition of fill material, only the Corps can issue section 404 per-
mits, and therefore EPA's broad control of "pollutants" under section 
402 is not limited by its own definition of fill material, rather it is lim-
ited only by the Corps's definition of fill material.131 The court, rely-
ing on the difference between the Corps's and EPA's definitions of fill 
material, denied the coal mining association's motion for summary 
judgment because the Corps's primary purpose definition did not in-
clude the disposal of spoil and the creation of wastewater treatment 
impoundment ponds.132 The court found that the primary purpose of 
the activity "is to dispose of waste or spoil and treat sediment-laden 
water, not to create dry land ... as contemplated by the Army's 
definition" and that the disposal of waste is specifically excluded from 
125 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Crr. 
2003). 
126 [d. 
12730U.S.C.§ 1265(b)(3) (2000). 
128 Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d at 431. 
129 E.g., Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 657 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), afl'd in part, va-
cated in part on other grounds sub nom. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Crr. 
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1113 (2002). 
130 W. Va. Coal Ass'n v. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (S.D. W. Va. 1989), afl'd per cu-
riam, Nos. 90-2034, 90-2040, 1991 WL 75217, at *3 (4th Crr. 1991). 
\31 See id. at 1285-86. 
132 [d. at 1287. 
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being fill material because the disposal of waste is regulated by EPA 
under section 402.133 Finally, the court noted that sediment runoff 
from valley fills satisfies the 1986 memorandum of agreement lan-
guage for regulation under EPA's NPDES program.134 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opin-
ion the reasoning that the primary purpose of these "fills and treat-
ment ponds is to dispose of waste and treat sediment-laden water, not 
to create dry land or to change the bottom elevation of the water. "135 
Accordingly, the court found that the in-stream treatment procedures 
are not within the Corps's definition of fill material and should be 
subject to EPA's authority under section 402.136 The court concluded 
that the purpose of the fills in this case is to dispose waste from min-
ing operations and, even though some embankments of the treatment 
ponds may be within the Corps's section 404 authority, this does not 
deprive EPA of its permitting authority over the discharge of pollut-
ants under section 402.137 Furthermore, the court concurred with the 
district court that the activities of this case are subject to EPA's NPDES 
program according to terms of the 1986 memorandum of agree-
ment. 138 In short, the court held the Corps to its primary purpose test 
and recognized the primacy of EPA's section 402 permitting author-
ity.139 
Following this case, in 1995 a New Mexico district court granted a 
defendant gold mine operator's motion for partial summary judg-
ment by dismissing an allegation that placing overburden from sur-
face gold mining in an arroyo without a permit violated section 404 of 
the CWAI40 The court found that the overburden was not fill material 
because the primary purpose of the discharge was "not to 'replace 
133 [d. 
134 [d. The court stated that sediment runoff from valley fills is a "discharge in liquid, 
semi-liquid, or suspended form." [d. (quoting Memorandum of Agreement on Solid Waste, 
51 Fed. Reg. 8871,8872 (Mar. 14, 1986». 
135 W. Va. Coal Ass'n v. Reilly, Nos. 90-2034, 90-2040, 1991 WL 75217, at *4 (4th Cir. 




139 See id. at *5; cf Hagerty, supra note 44, at 180 (asserting that the 1986 memorandum 
of agreement addresses an "ambiguity" concerning fill material, but not mentioning that 
the court of appeals applies the definition from the 1986 memorandum to the disposal 
activities in the case to conclude that these activities are subject to EPA's NPDES permit-
ting authority). 
140 Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1342-43 
(D.N.M.1995). 
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[the area] with dry land or [to] chang[e] the bottom elevation' of the 
streambed. "141 Again according to the Corps's definition of fill mate-
rial, the court found wastes, such as overburden from surface gold 
mining, to be under the jurisdiction of EPA, not the CorpS.142 More 
recent cases illustrate that the presumption of EPA regulation for val-
ley fill permitting in earlier cases has shifted to a presumption in favor 
of regulation by the Corps. 
B. The Bragg Case 
In a CitIZen suit that challenged permits granted under the 
SMCRA, district court Judge Haden ruled that the Corps does not 
have the authority under section 404 to regulate the disposal of spoil 
in valley fills because the primary purpose for disposing spoil is to 
dispose waste, which is regulated by section 402.143 The court consid-
ered the section 404 program to employ the section 404(b)( 1) guide-
lines as a substitute for the buffer zone rule under the SMCRA and 
held that the Director of the Corps has a duty to deny variances allow-
ing the placement of valley fills.144 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
avoided the section 404 issue and vacated the district court's injunc-
tion by concluding that sovereign immunity bars a citizen-suit chal-
lenge against a state official in federal court under the SMCRA.145 
More importantly, however, the Fourth Circuit upheld the set-
tlement agreement between the parties that the district court ap-
proved. l46 The settlement agreement required EPA, the Corps, the 
Office of Surface Mining (OSM), and other agencies to prepare a 
programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS) under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act to analyze the environmental impacts 
of permitting valley fills associated with mountaintop strip mining.147 
As a part of the settlement, the Corps agreed that proposed valley fills 
in West Virginia in watersheds of at least 250 acres must be permitted 
by individual, and not nationwide, permits. l48 One commentator 
141 Id. at 1342 (alterations in original) (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (1994)). 
142 Id. 
14! Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 656-57 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), a/I'd in part, va-
cated in part on other If''ounds sub nom. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1113 (2002). 
144 Id. at 658. 
145 Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d at 286. 
1f6 Id. 
1f7 DuffY, supra note 40, at 177. 
148 See id. 
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claimed that the Bragg case has caused valley fill permitting in West 
Virginia to be conducted through the individual permit process.149 A 
recent report by permitting agencies contradicts this proposition.150 
In 2002, when the Corps reissued nationwide permit (NWP) 21, 
the NWP associated with surface mining activities, it agreed to comply 
with the terms of the Bragg settlement agreement, but chose not to 
extend the 250-acre restriction to jurisdictions outside of West Vir-
ginia.151 The reissued NWP 21 adopted the following two changes 
from the previous NWP 21: (1) the Corps must make a case-by-case 
determination that the adverse effects to the aquatic environment 
caused by the proposed activity are minimal both individually and 
cumulatively before any project can be authorized; and (2) the Corps 
requires a compensatory mitigation plan to ensure that losses to the 
aquatic environment are minimal.152 The Corps provided a one-year 
grace period that expired February 11, 2003 for ongoing projects to 
comply with the reissued NWP 21,153 
Mter the expiration of this grace period, the Huntington District 
of the Corps sought section 404 compliance from mining opera-
tions,154 EPA and the Corps have since expressed concern that ongo-
ing coal mining operations have not met the conditions of the reis-
sued NWP 21 and do not have a valid section 404 permit for their 
149 Gardner, supra note 42, at 148. 
150 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS ET AL., MOUNTAINTIJP MINING/VALLEY FILL DRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT II.B-5 (2003) ("The COE [Corps] Huntington Dis-
trict has processed more than 160 NWP 21 permitting actions involving fills in West Vir-
gtoIa and Kentucky since the start of 1999."), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region3/mtntop/eis.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2004) [hereinafter 
MOUNTAINTIJP MINING EIS]. 
151 Issuance of Nationwide Permits, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2039 (jan. 15, 2002) (stating 
that the "Corps believes there are many different types of coal mining operations in other 
parts of the country and ... that the conditions of the settlement agreement may not be 
applicable to ntany of these other operations ft) • 
152 [d. at 2038; see also U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PRE-CONSTRUCTION NOTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONWIDE PERMIT 21, SURFACE COAL MINING ACTIVITIES 3 (2003) 
("Typically, compensatory mitigation consists of on-site []or off-site stream/wetland resto-
ration .... However, in some instances, it ntay be acceptable to allow the use of mitigation 
banks or an in-lieu fee arrangement .... A performance mitigation bond or other appro-
priate financial instruments may also be required .... ft), available at 
http://www.orn.usace.army.mil/cof/notices/pcnnwp21.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2004) 
[hereinafter PRE-CONSTRUCTION NOTIFICATION]. 
155 Issuance of Nationwide Permits, 67 Fed. Reg. at 2020. 
154 PRE-CONSTRUCTION NOTIFICATION, supra note 152, at 1 ("It is imperative that all 
mining operations that are currently discharging, or propose to discharge dredged or fill 
ntaterial into waters of the United States contact this office immediately to apply for a Sec-
tion 404 permit."). 
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activities.155 In short, the Corps appears to be scrambling to keep coal 
mining operators in compliance with section 404 requirements.156 
C. Mountaintop Mining EIS 
In early 1999, the Corps, EPA, the OSM, and others published a 
Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS directed towards developing 
agency policies and decision making processes "to minimize .. , the 
adverse environmental effects to waters of the United States and to 
fish and wildlife resources affected by mountaintop mining opera-
tions, and to environmental resources that could be affected by the 
size and location of excess spoil disposal sites in valley fills. "157 On May 
29, 2003, these agencies published a draft EIS on mountaintop min-
ing and valley fill activities for public comment.158 The geographic 
area of the EIS comprises about 12 million acres of Eastern Kentucky, 
Eastern Tennessee, Western Virginia, and Southern West Virginia 
which contain 59,000 miles of streams.159 The draft EIS includes the 
results of over thirty scientific and technical studies conducted relat-
ing to the impacts of mountaintop mining and excess spoil disposed 
as valley fills.l60 The EIS analyzes three alternatives, in addition to the 
no-action alternative, for improving agency decisionmaking in per-
mitting mountaintop mining and valley fill operations.161 
The three alternatives offer different approaches for handling 
permit applications of mountaintop mining and valley fill opera-
tions.162 Alternative 1 provides that the Corps would determine 
155 See Memorandum from U.S. EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers District Commanders & U.S. EPA Regional Administrators 1 (May 19, 
2003) ("In this regard, we are becoming increasingly aware of circumstances in Kentucky, 
West Virginia, and Ohio involving coal mining operations that may be discharging 
dredged or fill material in waters of the United States without current CWA authorization 
or a permit application to the Corps of Engineers.") (on file with author). 
156 See id. at 1-2 ("We believe it is necessary to provide information as soon as possible 
to the coal mining industry that reiterates CWA Section 404 permitting requirements and 
prompts those that may be discharging in waters to apply immediately to the Corps for a 
CWA Section 404 permit."). 
157 Notice ofIntent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. 5778, 
5778 (Feb. 5,1999). 
158 See MOUNTAINTI>P MINING FJS, supra note 150, at ES-1. 
159 [d. at ES-2. In 1998, 280 million tons of coal was extracted from the region, but over 
28 billion tons of high-quality coal remains. [d. 
160 [d. at ES-3. The studies noted that 1200 miles of headwater streams had been im-
pacted by moun rain top mining and valley fills from 1992-2002 and that 724 miles of 
streams were covered by valley fills from 1985-2001. [d. at ES-3 to ES-4. 
161 [d. at ES-4 to ES-5. 
162 See id. at ES-9. 
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whether to permit the proposed activities and the size of the valley 
fills.16! The Corps would conduct this review under the section 404 
individual permit procedure, although NWP 21 authorization may be 
available in selected circumstances. l64 Other permitting agencies 
would rely on decisions made by the Corps. Under Alternative 3 the 
SMCRA authority would determine the size, number, and location of 
valley fills permitted.t65 The SMCRA permitting review would be en-
hanced to include standards similar to the section 404 (b) (1) guide-
lines, while the Corps would authorize most projects under NWP 
21.166 The EIS concludes that these two alternatives would enhance 
environmental protection when compared with the no-action alterna-
tive, but it dismisses all three options.t67 
The preferred alternative, Alternative 2, provides that the regula-
tory agencies would integrate features of the CWA and SMCRA "into a 
coordinated regulatory process to determine the size, number, and 
location of valley fills in waters of the U.S. "168 The Corps would make 
case-by-case determinations whether a proposed operation would be 
subject to NWP 21 or individual permit processing.t69 This determina-
tion would be guided by a protocol that "provides a numerical score 
for stream segments based on physical, chemical, and macro-
invertebrate data collection. "170 
A joint permit process would incorporate permitting by the 
Corps under section 404 and permitting by the SMCRA authority 
concurrendy.t71 As a part of the SMCRA review, the OSM would 
"adopt regulations to allow data collection, impact predictions, alter-
native analysis, fill minimization, and on-site mitigation considerations 
in consonance with the CWA Section 404(b)(l) Guidelines. "172 This 
review would include a policy, developed by the West Virginia De-
partment of Environmental Protection, "requiring volumetric calcula-
tions and an engineering process to assure that excess spoil disposal 
resulted in the least stream impacts possible to conduct the proj-
163 Id. at ES-5. 
164 MOUNTAINTOP MINING EIS, supra note 150, at ll.B-3 tbl.ll.B-l. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at ll.B-9. 
167 Id. at ES-9. 
168 Id. at ES-5. 
169 Id. at 1l.B-B. 
170 MOUNTAINTOP MINING EIS, supra note 150, at 1l.B-5. 
171 Id. at 1l.B-9. 
172 Id. at ll.B-S. 
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ect. "173 Apart from these calculations, other features of this new, pro-
posed regulatory process are yet to be determined.174 
D. The Kentuckians Case 
Another group, Kentuckians for the Commonwealth (KFTC) , 
challenged, as violations of the CWA and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) , the Corps's issuance of a section 404 permit under 
NWP 21 allowing Martin County Coal Corporation (MCCC) to fill 
streams with spoil from coal strip mining.175 More specifically, the 
permit authorized twenty-seven valley fills that "would bury some 6.3 
miles of streams at the heads of the valleys. "176 KITC has noted that 
over the past twenty years, these activities have buried over 1500 miles 
of streams in Kentucky and West Virginia. 177 In this case, Judge Haden 
sustained the challenge and enjoined the issuance of the permit in 
questionl78 and any future permits by the Huntington District office 
of the Corps that have no primary purpose except to allow the waste 
. disposal of spoil removed from strip mining to be placed in valleys.179 
Challenges to a particular agency action under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review in the APA are subject to the two-part 
test established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil. lso The first prong of the test requires the reviewing court to em-
ploy the tools of statutory construction and give effect to Congress's 
intent, if a congressional intent can be discerned.181 If no congres-
173 [d. at 1I.B-6. 
174 [d. at 1I.B-9 ("The regulatory framework and process for this alternative would be 
embodied in an interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) among the regulatory 
agencies with authorities under the SMCRA or CWA and their respective implementing 
regulation.") . 
175 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 930 
(S.D. W. Va. 2002), vacated by 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003). 
176 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 431 (4th Cir. 
2003). 
177 KENTUCKIANS FOR THE COMMONWEAL TIl, APPEALS COURT OVERTURNS 
MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL DECISION, at http://www.kftc.org/prOI3003.ivnu (last visited Apr. 
26,2004). 
178 Rivenlmrgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 946. The court further declared the recently adopted 
new definition of fill material by the two agencies to be ultra vires just days before the rule 
was made final on May 9, 2002. [d. at 945. 
179 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 206 F. Supp. 2d 782, 808 
(S.D. W. Va. 2002), vacated by 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (clarifying the injunction issued 
and limiting its future scope to the Huntington District of the Corps). 
180 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
181 [d. at 842 (stating that "the question [is] whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue"). 
640 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:617 
sional intent can be found, the second prong of the test requires a 
reviewing court to defer to any reasonable construction of the statute 
or regulation by the agency.182 
Following step one of the Chevron test, the district court found 
the intention of Congress on the issue of section 404 permits for waste 
disposal to be clear in three ways.183 First, relying on section 404(f) (2), 
Judge Haden reasoned that section 404 permits require the discharge 
of fill to be undertaken with a purpose that relates to using the land 
that will be created by the fill.l84 Second, he concluded since section 
10 of the RHA, which regulated only improvements in the navigable 
waters, was the sole source of authority for section 404 while section 
13 of the RHA, which regulated all waste disposal other than dredged 
material, was explicitly replaced by the section 402 program, section 
404 permits must be limited to activities that are improvements and 
not disposals of waste. l85 Lastly, Judge Haden decided that since the 
SMCRA requires coal mining operators to return removed overbur-
den to the mining site unless the site can be put to a better economic 
use, and because the SMCRA is in harmony with the provisions of the 
CWA, the SMCRA does not authorize the disposal of spoil from min-
ing activities in streams. l86 Thus, the court concluded that there is a 
clear intention of Congress for the section 404 program not to in-
clude the disposal of waste, and that the discharge of spoil from strip 
mining in streams is waste disposal, and therefore the discharge of 
spoil into valley streams must be enjoined.187 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the injunction, reversed 
the district court requirement that fill material must be limited to ma-
terial deposited for a beneficial purpose, and remanded the case, 
while effectively leaving the most relevant substantive issues as open 
182 [d. at 843 (stating that "the question for the court is whether the agency's [interpre-
tation] is based on a permissible construction of the statute"). 
183 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 441 (4th Cir. 
2003) (suggesting that the district court relied upon section 404(f) (2) of the CWA, the 
CWA relation to the RHA, and the CWA relation to SMCRA as indicia of congressional 
intent with regards to the definition of fill material). 
184 [d. at 937. Section 404(f) (2) states that "any discharge of dredged or fill material 
into the navigable waters incidental to any activity having as its purpose bringing an area of 
the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject ... shall be required 
to have a permit under this section." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (2) (2000). 
180 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 935-
36 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), vacated by 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003). 
186 [d. at 941-42. 
187 See id. at 932-33, 946-47. 
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questions. l88 The court declared that the case is not about the new 
effects-based definition of fill material adopted by the two agencies in 
2002, but rather whether the permit granted to the MCCC to deposit 
spoil in valleys violates section 404 and the Corps's 1977 primary pur-
pose definition of fill material. 189 
Under step one of Chevron the circuit court, disagreeing with the 
district court, found that there was no clear intent on the part of 
Congress to limit fill material to material deposited for some 
beneficial purpose and not waste material. 190 The court found that 
section 404(f) (2) provides an exception to the list of exceptions in 
404(f) (1) and not a limit on the type of discharges available for a sec-
tion 404 permit generally.19l The court dismissed the district court's 
RHA analysis by noting that section 10 may prohibit the discharge of 
waste since waste would presumably alter the condition of navigable 
waters.192 The court also stressed that section 10 has been used to 
prohibit the discharge of solid industrial waste into navigable rivers.193 
Finally, the court found, contrary to the district court, that the 
SMCRA allows excess spoil to be deposited into the waters of the 
United States under certain conditions even if the material does not 
have a beneficial purpose.194 
The circuit court then undertook the Chevron test's step two 
analysis, concluding that the Corps's primary purpose definition is a 
permissible reading of the CWA, and that the agency's practice was 
consistent with this definition. 195 The court relied on the preamble to 
the proposed rule change in 2000 and ten years of practice regarding 
the division of authority between the Corps and EPA in deciding that 
the Corps's interpretation of the 1977 definition of fill material is 
consistent with the text of that definition.196 The majority asserted 
that the practice associated with the division of authority between the 
Corps for fills and EPA for effluents is decisive, and since the Corps's 
188 See Rivenlmrgh, 317 F.3d at 448. 
189 Id. at 438. This approach decisively rejects the argument that the new effects-based 
definition by the agencies "obviate[s] the plaintiffs' claims." Contra Hagerty, supra note 44, 
at 181. 
190 Rivenlmrgh, 317 F.3d at 441. 
191 Id. at 441-42. 
192 See id. at 442. 
193Id. (citing United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960». 
194 Id. at 443. 
195 Id. at 444, 448. 
196 Rivenlmrgh, 317 F.3d at 445. 
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"practice reflects its interpretation,"197 the waste exclusion in the 
Corps's 1977 definition does not "defer to the EPA on all material de-
posited for disposal," just material that is subject to EPA's effluent 
limitations.19B 
In partial dissent, Judge Luttig criticized the majority's reliance 
on the statements made in the 2000 proposed revision by the agencies 
because these statements do not address the Corps's interpretation of 
its 1977 regulations and they may in fact illustrate a need to reconcile 
a discrepancy between the language of the regulations and the 
. agency's practice.199 He further stressed that the majority should have 
simply vacated the injunction and remanded the case for the Corps to 
present its interpretation of its 1977 primary purpose test. 2OO Judge 
Luttig's opinion, more so than the majority opinion, leaves the sub-
stantive issue of this case unresolved-namely, whether the granting 
of this permit to the MCCC violated the Corps's 1977 primary pur-
pose regulation of fill material. 201 
On remand, KFTC's effort to file a supplemental complaint was 
denied by Judge Haden because the NWP 21 permit authorization in 
question had expired, making the case moot.202 KFTC attempted to 
allege that the Corps had no authority to modify the NWP 21 authori-
zation in question after the MCCC's successor Beech Fork Processing, 
Inc. (Beech Fork) admitted in a letter to the Corps that it could mine 
coal under its permit without placing spoil in the waters of the United 
States.203 Judge Haden held that since the NWP 21 authorization ex-
pired February 21, 2003, Beech Fork currently had no permit 
authorization to fill streams with excess spoil.204 He further noted that 
Beech Fork has applied for authorization under the reissued NWP 21, 
197 Id. at 446 n.3. 
198 Id. at 447. 
199 Id. at 451 (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(emphasizing that the Army Corps does not state its interpretation of its 1977 regulation). 
200 Id. at 451-52. (noting that it is not obvious how the disposal of spoil into streams 
has the primary purpose of making dry land or elevating the streambed). 
201 Id. at 452. Judge Luttig's opinion, in contrast to the majority's opinion, offers sup-
port for the contention that he is "eager to be perceived as more moderate in anticipation 
of a Supreme Court opening." See Deborah Son tag, The Power of the Fourth: How One Appel-
late Court Is Qy,ietly Moving America Ever Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), 
at 43. 
202 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 269 F. Supp. 2d 710, 713 
(S.D. W. Va. 2003). 
203 Id. at 712. 
204Id. at 715 ("Under the permit, if approved, Beech Fork proposes to fill 9,220 feet of 
jurisdictional waters ofthe United States. "). 
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and if granted a challenge to any future authorization would not 
evade judicial review. 205 
IV. ANALYSIS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW EFFECTS-BASED DEFINITION 
OF FILL MATERIAL 
As a starting point, the agencies recognize that the definition of 
fill material provides the dividing line between the section 404 and 
section 402 programs.206 Thus, any change in the scope of what con-
stitutes fill material would presumably change whether some activities 
would be subject to the section 404 program or the section 402 pro-
gram.207 Contrary to this intuition, in promulgating the new rule, the 
agencies stress that the new definition "is intended to maintain our 
existing approach to regulating pollutants under either section 402 or 
404," even though the new definition eliminated the explicit excep-
tion for discharges covered by section 402 permits. 208 Theoretically, 
this means that the exception for discharges covered by section 402 
still exists; however, "existing approach" most likely means current 
regulatory practice.209 
One possibility regarding the result of the rule change is that the 
baseline has changed.210 Previously, fill material and the section 404 
program did not encroach upon pollutants that could potentially be 
covered by the NPDES program.211 Rather it constituted an exception; 
namely, section 404 reached some of the remaining material that was 
not within the reach of the NPDES program.212 Moreover, the NPDES 
205 Id. at 716. 
206 Revisions to the Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material: 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 
21,293 (proposed Apr. 20, 2000) (stating that "the term 'fill material' under the CWA is 
important in determining whether a proposed discharge of a pollutant is subject to regula-
tion under section 404 or section 402"). 
207 See id. 
208 Revisions to the Regulatory Definition of "Fill Material: 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 
31,135 (May 9,2002) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323; 40 C.F.R. pt. 232). One has to 
doubt this conclusion when "[t]he comments of environmental groups and the various 
form letters were strongly opposed to the proposal [while] ... comments from the regu-
lated community generally supported the proposal." See id. at 31,131. The regulated com-
munity's support for the final definition must be even stronger. 
209Id. at 31,135. 
210 See id. 
211 E.g., Regulatory Programs of the Corps, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,130 (July 19, 1977). 
212Id. 
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program explicitly limited the scope of the section 404 permitting 
au thority. 213 
Now, however,.fill material defines the extent of the NPDES pro-
gram.214 As recently stated, where material is already determined to 
constitute fill, only pollutants subject to effluent limitations are ex-
cluded from regulation as fill.215 Furthermore, the new rule attempts 
to foreclose the possibility that a discharge activity, already satisfying 
the definition of fill material, may become subject to section 402 regu-
lation-instead of section 404 regulation-as a result of EPA propos-
ing a new effluent limitation for a pollutant that is a part of that dis-
charge activity.216 In other words, the NPDES program may no longer 
preempt section 404 permitting of a discharge activity that satisfies 
the agencies' new definition of fill materia1.217 This change is a 
significant departure from the original congressional perspective that 
the section 404 permitting program was to constitute an exception to 
EPA's NPDES program.218 Under the current definition of fill material 
and regulatory practice by the agencies regarding some activities, 
however, it appears that EPA cannot expand the NPDES program to 
regulate pollutants that are present in discharge activities regulated by 
the Corps's section 404 program.219 
The discrepancy between the treatment of waste before and after 
the adoption of the regulation illustrates this change.22o As noted 
above, the Corps's previous regulation explicitly stated that the dis-
m See Revisions to the Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material," 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 
21,300 (proposed Apr. 20, 2000). 
214 See Revisions to the Regulatory Definition of "Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,134. 
The agencies state that the "rule does not affect the application of section 402 of the CWA 
to discharges of pollutants other than fill material that may be associated with such things as 
solid waste landfill structures and mine impoundments." Id. (emphasis added). These 
examples are just the beginning, because the new definition of fill material is not limited 
to the inclusion of only landfill structures and mine impoundments; it includes anything 
that is not trash or garbage. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2)-(3) (2003); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2. 
215 See Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 445 (4th 
Crr. 2003) ("[WJ hen the Corps issued the permit ... it was authorized to regulate dis-
charges of fill, even for waste, unless the fill amounted to effluent that could be subjected 
to effluent limitations."). 
216 See supra text accompanying note 214. 
217 See supra text accompanying note 214. 
218 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1) (2000) (stating that, except as provided in section 404, 
EPA may issue NPDES permits for discharges of pollutants). 
219 See supra text accompanying note 214. 
220 Compare 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(m) (2001), with Revisions to the Regulatory Definition of 
"Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,133 (May 9, 2002) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
323; 40 C.F.R. pt. 232). 
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posal of waste was subject to section 402.221 Now the agencies "believe 
that a categorical exclusion [from the 404 program] for waste would 
be over-broad. Instead, where a waste has the effect of fill, we believe 
that regulation under the section 404 program is appropriate. "222 Ac-
cordingly, the logical conclusion is either that the scope of 404 pro-
gram is broader than it previously was or that the Corps did not actu-
ally follow its previous definition, or both.223 
Proponents of the revision counter contentions that this rule is 
an attempt to frustrate environmental protection by arguing that "the 
rule making was initiated by the agencies under the prior, Democratic 
administration. "224 Though the initial rulemaking change did propose 
to eliminate the distinction between waste and fill, the proposal rec-
ognized that the disposal of solid waste from certain mining activities, 
but not coal mining overburden, will continue to be regulated by 
EPA's section 402 program and moreover invited comment on 
whether these specified solid waste disposal activities "fully encom-
pass [] the range of discharges properly subject to section 402. "225 The 
final rule formally eliminates the distinction between waste and fill 
material.226 
A more nuanced difference between the proposed and final rule 
illustrates that the final rule attempts to circumscribe the jurisdiction 
of EPA's NPDES program in terms of the Corps's definition of fill ma-
teria1.227 Specifically, the proposed rule provided an exclusion from 
the definition of fill materials for discharge activities regulated by 
final or proposed effluent limitations standards or NPDES permits.228 
The implication is that EPA, by publishing proposed effluent limita-
tions for a pollutant, could shift the regulation of disposal activities 
221 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2001) ("[Fill material] does not include any pollutant dis-
charged into the water primarily to dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated under 
Section 402."). 
222 Revisions to the Regulatory Definition of "Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,133. 
223 See id. (stating that the two agencies disagree with comments that the expansion of 
section 404 jurisdiction is inappropriate). 
224 Gardner, supra note 42, at 147. 
225 Revisions to the Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material,· 65 Fed. Reg. at 21,296. 
226 Revisions to the Regulatory Definition of "Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,133. 
227 See id. at 31,135. 
228 Revisions to the Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material," 65 Fed. Reg. at 21,295-96 
("Also, today's proposal recognizes that discharges from coal mining activities that are 
covered by a proposed or final EPA effluent guideline ... are not fill material and would 
remain subject to regulation under CWA section 402".). 
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involving that pollutant from section 404 to section 402.229 This inter-
pretation is recognized and explicitly thwarted by the final rule.230 
Rather, the final rule is an effort to preclude EPA from adopting 
effluent limitations for pollutants present in activities that satisfy the 
definition of fill materia1. 231 
In short, the Corps has replaced a desire for a workable program 
in favor of a more objective approach for determining what activities 
are subject to the section 404 program.232 Nevertheless, review of cer-
tain activities subject to the section 404 program, like mountaintop 
mining and valley fills, requires a more coordinated analysis and 
framework than currently exists under the section 404 program 
alone.233 Thus, the emphasis has shifted from ensuring that the ad-
ministrative state can manage and preserve the waters of the United 
States to ensuring consistent treatment of activities and providing cer-
tainty for the regulated community.234 
CONCLUSION 
Since the creation of the section 404 permitting program over 
thirty years ago, the Corps and EPA have struggled to define fill mate-
rial in a way that strikes a meaningful balance of including many ac-
tivities and excluding activities that were beyond the scope of the pro-
gram. During much of this period, each agency defined fill material 
differently because each agency had differing policy perspectives 
about the breadth of the section 404 program. This resulted in an in-
consistency between the operation of the program by the Corps and 
229 See id. ("We welcome comment on all aspects of today's proposal, and especially so-
licit comment on whether the proposal's reference to discharges covered by proposed or 
final effluent limitations guidelines and standards ... covered by an NPDES permit fully 
encompasses the range of discharges properly subject to section 402 of the Act."). 
230 See Revisions to the Regulatory Definition of "Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,135 
("[T]he language in the actual rule could raise questions as to whether the reference to 
effluent guidelines was meant to refer only to those in existence at the time today's rule 
was promulgated or whether the reference was prospective."). 
231 See id. (claiming that "EPA has never sought to regulate fill material under effluent 
guidelines") . 
232Id. at 31,133 (claiming that "it is important to use an objective, effects-based test"); 
Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,320 (July 25,1975) (stat-
ing the comments received addressed "the dual purposes of the FWPCA [CWA]: First, the 
development of a workable program; and, second, the needs of water quality"). 
233 See supra Part m.c. 
234 Revisions to the Regulatory Definition of "Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,133. 
The ability of this regulatory change to provide certainty to the regulated community in 
contexts such as mountaintop mining and valley fills may have been overestimated. See 
supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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its regulations. In effect, the Corps over time adopted EPA's broad 
implementation policy toward the section 404 program, rendering its 
primary purpose test moot. The change in treatment by the courts 
towards excess spoil in mountaintop mining cases illustrates this pol-
iey shift towards the section 404 program by the Corps. The inevitable 
outcome of this policy shift was to abandon the primary purpose test 
in favor of a more inclusive definition of fill material. 
The result of the new definition, however, may be nothing more 
than to recreate the problems of the primary purpose test in reverse. 
If the primary purpose test became irrelevant because it made the 
hurdle for activities that qualify as fill material too high, the new ef-
fects-based definition may become irrelevant because it fails to ex-
clude almost any activity from being considered fill material. 
Before this occurs, however, the expansion of the section 404 
permitting program may come at the expense of EPA's NPDES pro-
gram. The agencies have suggested that the NPDES program may not 
regulate activities that may be considered fill material. Thus, the 
NPDES program is now potentially cabined by this new definition of 
fill material. Furthermore, the cases involving excess spoil disposal 
from mountaintop mining suggest that EPA's failure to define 
effluent limitations for activities that were presumed to be subject to 
NPDES allows those activities to instead be subject to section 404 un-
der the new definition of fill material. In short, the new definition en-
ables the Corps to permit activities under section 404 that may have 
been within the purview of the NPDES program. The upshot is that 
because the effluent limitation standards under the NPDES program 
are often more stringent than what is required to obtain a section 404 
permit, the burden of this new definition of fill material will be borne 
by the Nation's wetlands. 

